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Abstract—Remote attestation is a security technique by
which a potentially untrusted device called Prover can evidence
its current state to an external trusted party called Verifier. The
main goal of a remote attestation protocol is to guarantee the
reliability of the evidence, such that the Verifier can verify
remotely the trustworthiness of the Prover. In the Internet of
Things (IoT) systems, which are increasingly becoming exposed
to a broad range of exploitations, the existing remote attesta-
tion protocols aim to check the integrity of each individual
IoT device by detecting the modified softwares and physical
tampering attacks. However, in an interconnected IoT system,
in which IoT devices interact autonomously among themselves,
a compromised IoT service can influence the genuine operation
of other invoked service, without changing the software.
In this paper, we show how a compromised service in a
distributed IoT service can induce malicious behavior on gen-
uine services, and we highlight the need for distributed services
attestation. We propose a protocol for Remote Attestation of
Distributed IoT Services (RADIS), which provides a complete
evidence about the trustworthiness of distributed IoT services.
RADIS relies on a control-flow attestation technique to detect
IoT services that perform an unexpected operation due to
their interactions with a malicious remote service. Additionally,
RADIS traces the interactions between IoT distributed services,
allowing the Verifier to check whether the activities follow a
legitimate interaction model. We discuss the effectiveness of
our protocol in validating the integrity status of a distributed
IoT service.
Keywords-Remote attestation; Distributed IoT services; Ser-
vice Flow;
I. INTRODUCTION
Interoperability of IoT systems is estimated to create 40
percent of the potential value that can be generated by the
Internet of Things in various settings [1]. Ability of IoT de-
vices to connect and communicate among themselves allows
IoT systems to deal with a variety of complex operations that
exceed the constrained resources of individual IoT devices.
However, the limited capabilities of the IoT devices to adopt
traditional security techniques exposes IoT systems to a huge
number of potential attacks [2], [3], [4]. Thus, a security
mechanism that guarantees the secure interaction between
devices plays a key role in establishing trust in an IoT
system.
Remote attestation has emerged as a security mechanism
that provides evidence about the trustworthiness of a device.
The goal of a remote attestation protocol is to provide
some unforgeable evidence to a remote trusted entity, called
Verifier, to testify the authenticity and integrity of the inter-
nal state on an untrusted platform, called Prover. Typically,
the internal state of resource-constrained devices comprises
the program binaries stored in the program memory of
the device and the runtime state of the software stored
in data memory. During a normal software execution, the
content of the program memory remains static, whereas
the data memory’s contents always change. While existing
remote attestation protocols differ in the parts of the device’s
memory that they consider during the verification process
and hardware assumptions, most of the existing attestation
protocols verify only the program memory of a prover [5],
[6], [7]. These protocols provide a checksum only for the
program binaries loaded on the prover’s program memory.
The biggest drawback of these protocols is the lack of
capability to detect prevalent runtime software attacks that
target data memory of the devices [8]. These protocols do
not guarantee the software integrity against an adversary that
performs code reuse attack by exploiting memory corruption
vulnerabilities to deviate an intended control-flow of a
software by only changing the control-flow pointers at the
runtime of an existing code, or non-control data attacks
by manipulating some variables that make the control flow
to follow a valid but non authorized direction. To mitigate
the runtime attacks, some other attestation approaches have
emerged in checking the correctness of the application
during the execution time [9], [10], [11]. However, existing
remote attestation schemes do not consider an interoperable
IoT system, in which a compromised distributed service can
impact the integrity of other devices of the distributed IoT
services that interact with the malicious remote service.
Our Contribution: In this paper, we propose RADIS, a
remote attestation protocol for distributed IoT services. The
contributions of this paper are threefold:
• We highlight the need for a distributed services attes-
tation.
• We define the required security properties for a dis-
tributed IoT service setting, and describe the adversary
model.
• We present a remote attestation protocol that ensures
the integrity of all the services involved in the execution
of a distributed IoT service.
Outline: The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In
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Section II, we provide an overview of the current state-of-
the-art remote attestation approaches and provide a compar-
ison with our work. We describe the problem in Section III
while in Section IV we present the system model. In Section
V, we describe the adversary model and define the required
security properties. We introduce the preliminary concepts
in Section VI and provide our protocol details in Section
VII. Finally, we provide qualitative evaluation in Section
VIII and the paper concludes in Section IX.
II. RELATED WORKS
In this section, we provide an overview of previous work
related to remote attestation protocols. We focus particularly
on attestation of distributed services in traditional systems
and state-of-the-art remote attestation protocols in IoT sys-
tems.
The work in [12] proposes BIND as a fine-grained at-
testation scheme for traditional distributed systems. BIND
assumes that the most critical parts of the service software
are predefined by programmers. Thus, in the attestation time,
instead of attesting the code for the entire sequence of the
distributed services, BIND attests only the selected piece
of code for each service. BIND measures a critical code
immediately before entering in the code execution and uses a
sand-boxing mechanism to serve as a protection for ensuring
the untampered code execution. However, BIND does not
address attacks that happen in the intermediary code that is
not annotated for attestation. In our protocol, the runtime
attestation takes into consideration all the software of the
service without limiting the attestation only to predefined
section of code. The authors in [13] present a integrity
attestation that aims to check whether a subroutine of a pro-
gram is executed correctly. The proposed scheme leverages
Trusted Computing Group (TCG) attestation to build a trust
chain rooted at Trusted Platform Module (TPM) for function
execution. The attestation schemes presented in [12] and [13]
are not designed for resource-constrained devices.
In IoT systems, collective attestation schemes aim to
verify the internal state of a large group of devices in a more
efficient way than attesting each of devices individually. The
attestation approach proposed in SEDA [14] constructs the
interconnected network as a spanning-tree. In this scheme,
each device statically attests its children and reports back
to its parent the number of children that successfully passed
the attestation protocol. In the end, an aggregated report with
the total number of the devices successfully attested will be
transmitted to the Verifier. The weakest point of this protocol
is that a compromised node can impact the integrity of the
attestation result of all its children nodes in the aggregation
tree. This problem is tackled by SANA [15], which relies
on the use of a multi-signature scheme to propose a scalable
attestation protocol with untrusted aggregators. Here, devices
sign the attestation responses and an aggregation of the
signatures is used to validate the network in a constant
time. The basic assumption followed by both SEDA and
SANA is that the network is fully interconnected. The work
in [16] rules out this assumption and proposes an efficient
protocol for highly dynamic networks. In this proposal, each
device performs the local attestation at the same point in
time and shares the individual result with other devices in
the network. Then, devices use the consensus algorithm to
gain knowledge about the state of the other devices in the
network. At the attestation time, the verifier can perform
the attestation over a random device, which will report
the consensus state of the entire network. However, the
collective attestation schemes do not consider the flow of
the interactions between devices and the data flow that goes
from one device to another. Therefore, these schemes detect
devices that are running a modified software, but they do
not check whether the devices with legitimate software are
executing a task on malicious data. We argue that, in a
distributed system, a service victim of a run-time attack
can propagate malicious behavior to all the devices that
requested that service, even though the software running
on those devices is legitimate. Additionally, the existing
collective attestation schemes verify only the integrity of
the static program memory without providing a validation
mechanism for the data memory. Thus, runtime attacks
remain undetected.
Dynamic attestation approaches aim to verify the run-time
state of the Prover during the normal software execution.
The work in [9] proposes ReDAS as an attestation protocol
that verifies the properties of the run-time behavior of the
Prover. When any of the properties is violated, ReDAS stores
the relevant evidence in a Trusted Platform Module (TPM).
ReDAS checks the system integrity only at system calls,
and it traces only the order of the launched modules in a
system. Therefore, it does not detect the malware presence
between system calls, and it does not check the runtime
flow of the instructions of a specific module. C-FLAT [10]
proposes a complete attestation of the run-time state of the
Prover. During the execution, each software instruction is
reported into a so-called “trusted anchor” and from there, a
hash engine mechanism accumulates the sequence of the
instructions into a single hash value that represents the
entire control flow of the Prover’s state. A Verifier, who
has initially computed and stored a set of all the possible
valid hashes of the Prover, can detect control-flow attacks,
since a Prover targeted with a control-flow run-time attack
will report an unexpected hash value to the Verifier. A
practical version of C-FLAT is introduced in LO-FAT [17].
Instead of the software instrumentation used in C-FLAT, LO-
FAT explores the features of the microcontroller to intercept
the instructions, providing in this way an implementation
of C-FLAT with low overhead. ATRIUM [11] proposes a
hardware based runtime attestation protocol that is resilient
against Time of Check Time of Use attacks. ATRIUM attests
both executed instructions and the control flow.
DEVICE i DEVICE xDEVICE j
Si1 Sj1 Sx1 Sx2
Level 1: Devices
 
Level 2: Services
1 2 3
Input
Sj2 Sj3
Service flow
Figure 1. Service Flow of IoT devices
However, the existing dynamic attestation protocols fol-
low the one-device-attestation approach and do not provide
a complete evidence about the integrity of the services that
compose a distributed IoT system.
III. PROBLEM SETTING
In a heterogeneous IoT system, some of the devices
can operate both as clients and servers, and these devices
interact among themselves through their available services
in the network. A conceptual view of these interactions is
illustrated in Figure 1. Here, each of the devices shown
in Level 1, Device i, Device j, and Device x provide a
set of services, as represented in Level 2. In this setting,
the execution of a complex operation, which is beyond the
capacities or functionalities of a single device, requires the
invocation of a remote service provided by other devices.
Likewise, the called service might still be too complex for
the resources of a device, and therefore it invokes other
service calls to complete its task. The sequence of all the
services involved in fulfilling an operation is called Service
Flow, and the notation for the Service Flow depicted in
Figure 1 is Si1 → Sj3 → Sx2. Also, the set of services
Si1 → Sj3 → Sx2 communicating with each other to
support the operation form a distributed service. Note that a
given distributed service can follow a different service flow
based on different invocations, depending, for example, on
the input parameters.
In the following, we consider the interoperation between
services in a Smart Home IoT system enabled by the
communication of three IoT devices: an Outdoor Camera,
a central Security Monitor, and a Smart Door. A motion
sensing Outdoor Camera observes outside the main door of
the home, and when any movement of objects or people
is detected, the camera captures an image and reports it
to a Security Monitor. Once the Security Monitor gets the
captured image, it analyzes the image, and if it identifies
a family member, it sends an unlock command to open
the Smart Door, as shown in Figure 2. The service flow
in this scenario is: captureImage() → checkImage() →
unlockDoor().
Devil’s Ivy attack [18] shows how an attacker exploits a
vulnerability in a widely used library to take control over
a security camera. Here, the attacker uses Return-Oriented
Programming (ROP) technique [19] to change at runtime
the execution flow of genuine pieces of code loaded on
the device’s memory and, consequently, produce a malicious
code. As these attacks can become pervasive in IoT systems,
a prominent requirement for the attestation schemes is the
detection of run-time attacks, which target the data memory
and do not modify the program memory of a device. The
attestation of data memory of individual devices requires the
execution of a single-device attestation protocol that detects
subverted control flows. One possible example of such attes-
tation protocol is C-FLAT [10]. In the case the device is not
compromised, a control-flow attestation protocol, running on
a single device, will report the benign state of the device.
For instance, when a single-device control-flow attestation
protocol attests a genuine Smart Door, it will ensure its
correctness.
2 3
Outdoor
camera
Adversary
1
Input from
Motion Sensor
checkImage() unlockDoor()
captureImage()
Security
Monitor
Smart
Door
4
response
5
response
Figure 2. Device interaction in Smart Home IoT System
Now, consider an attack scenario where an adversary
subverts the control-flow of another device of the distributed
service, e.g., the Security Monitor device. After this attack,
a single-device control-flow attestation procedure executed
on the Smart Door will report again the correctness of the
Smart Door. This is because the adversary has not changed
the software of Smart Door and has not deviated its control-
flow. However, even though the adversary is located only
in the Security Monitor and the Smart Door passes all the
checks of the control-flow attestation procedure, we show
that the Smart Door can be forced into an incorrect state.
By changing the control-flow of the Security Monitor
device, the adversary is able to generate malicious software
executions on the Security Monitor that can produce ma-
licious data, and can influence the current behavior of the
other interconnected devices. As a consequence, the state
of the Smart Door may be corrupted by the commands
invoked maliciously from the Security Monitor to the Smart
Door. For example, an unlockDoor() command initiated as
result of a control-flow attack can open the door even if
the camera has not captured the image of a family member.
We thus argue that the Smart Door may have a genuine
software, but its behavior is not legitimate if it is performing
an unexpected operation due to the command or input that
it received from a malicious code executed in the Security
Monitor device.
One could think to detect this attack by running a single-
device control-flow attestation protocol on every device of
the IoT system. Indeed, the evaluation of the results of
control-flow attestation protocols, running on each individual
IoT device, will report the malicious devices in the network.
For example, the results of control-flow attestation protocols,
running on each on the three devices of our scenario, would
report the Security Monitor as a compromised device and
the Smart Door in a legitimate state. However, control-flow
attestation protocols, running on every device, cannot detect
the devices that have been influenced by the attacker and
forced into an incorrect state.
To explain the details how the run-time attack occurs,
Figure 3 illustrates the pseudo-code of the three services in-
volved in the aforementioned service flow: captureImage()
→ checkImage() → unlockDoor(). Based on the instruc-
tions of this pseudo-code, for each service a Control Flow
Graph is constructed, where each instruction is presented as
a node of the graph, as shown in Figure 4. During the normal
operation, each service follows the intended control-flow and
then invokes a service call to the next device.
The adversary located in Security Monitor (Device j)
performs a control-flow attack by changing the pointer
between two nodes of the Control Flow Graph (Nj13
goes into Nj8 instead of going into Nj6), as shown in
Figure 4. Note that when the execution flow reached at
Node Nj13, the variable cmd was assigned as “false”.
The malicious alteration prevents the execution of notify ()
in Node Nj6 and maliciously redirects the execution to
Node Nj8, which assigns the variable cmd with the value
“true”, and then proceeds to Node Nj9 to call the service
unlockDoor (cmd). This control-flow attack has two poten-
tial effects. First, the compromised argument cmd, produced
by the subverted control-flow in Security Monitor, is used in
node Nx2 of Smart Door (Device x) as a decision-making
variable that defines the further operations of Smart Door.
This means that Smart Door, even though is running a gen-
uine software, can maliciously run unlock () command in
Node Nx3 because of the compromised argument received.
Second, the malicious subversion of the control-flow to Node
Nj8 changes also the control-flow of the interaction between
services since the notify () instruction in Node Nj6 is
not executed. Specifically, instead of calling the device that
provides the service notify (), which may report an alert
on the smartphone of the owner, the Security Monitor will
call the unlock () command in the Smart Door. This run-
time attack shows that a compromised device (Device j)
induces a malicious behavior into a subset of IoT devices,
even though the software running on the subset of the
devices is not altered in any way by the attacker. Therefore,
to produce a correct attestation response of a distributed
service, the attestation scheme is required not only to report
the device running the malicious code, but also to verify all
other devices which interact with the infected device and are
performing a non-intended operation due to their interactions
with the infected device.
IV. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a distributed IoT system, where each hetero-
geneous IoT device Di provides a number ni of services,
each uniquely identified as Siu where 1 ≤ u ≤ ni.
In a typical distributed IoT service, each service invokes
an explicit service request to another service according to
a predefined interaction model. At runtime, a distributed
IoT service may follow various service flows, thus, the
aim of the attestation mechanism is to check the integrity
of a distributed service by verifying that a given service
flow is legitimate. In modeling the attestation scheme of
a distributed IoT service, we consider the presence of the
following entities:
• Device Di: a number of interconnected devices that
compose a distributed IoT system. Each device hosts
ni different services, which can be identified in the dis-
tributed system by a unique name Siu, for 1 ≤ u ≤ ni.
• System operator OP : responsible for the trusted de-
ployment of the distributed IoT system.
• Verifier V rf : a trusted external party who checks the
integrity of a service flow of the distributed IoT system.
V rf may be different from OP . V rf has access to the
binaries of all the services deployed on the distributed
IoT system. The attestation runs periodically at an
arbitrary time determined by V rf .
Initially, an IoT system operator OP validates the identi-
ties of the devices, authorizes their access, and verifies the
correct version of the software and services available on
them. Then, a Verifier V rf , responsible for the integrity
check of the distributed services, performs an offline pro-
cedure to measure all genuine services that compose the
distributed IoT system. During the service measurement
procedure, V rf considers the legitimate service flows and
all possible legitimate control-flows of the genuine services
that compose a service flow. Next, V rf generates the
measurement for each service flow, and at the end of this
procedure, V rf stores in a database a single hash value for
each legitimate service flow. A conceptual overview of our
system model is depicted in Figure 5.
At the attestation time, V rf sends an attestation request
1© to the device hosting the first service of a given service
flow. Upon receiving the attestation request, the device
initiates attestation process for the intended service 2©.
Every service call invocation includes the attestation result
of the calling service. This process binds all the services
attestation reports generated through the entire service flow
2© - 6©. After completion, the first service of the service flow
sends to V rf the final attestation report of the entire service
flow 7©. In the end, V rf validates the received result with
the known measurements stored previously in the database
8©. If the final attestation result matches with one of the pre-
calculated values, V rf ensures that the service flow is in the
legitimate state. Otherwise, the service flow is compromised.
Device i: Outdoor Camera Device j: Security Monitor Device x: Smart door
1: captureImage() {
2: motion← sensor.value();
3: if motion then
4: img ← camera.capture();
5: checkImage(img);
6: end if
7: }
1: checkImage(img) {
2: cmd← false;
3: member ← searchFamily(img);
4: if member is false then
5: verifyUnknownImage(img);
6: notify();
7: else
8: cmd← true;
9: unlockDoor(cmd);
10: end if
11: }
12: service: searchFamily()
13: service: verifyUnknownImage()
1: unlockDoor(cmd) {
2: if cmd is true then
3: unlock();
4: else
5: lock();
6: end if
7: }
8: service: lock()
9: service: unlock()
(a) service Si1: captureImage() (b) service Sj3: checkImage() (c) service Sx2: unlockDoor()
Figure 3. Pseudo-code of the service flow in Fig.2
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Figure 4. Control flow of the distributed service in Fig.2
V. ADVERSARY MODEL AND SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
A. Adversary model
The main goal of an adversary Adv is to compromise
the execution of a distributed IoT service to influence its
results maliciously. Thus, the aim of remote attestation is
to detect the distributed services which are compromised or
maliciously influenced by Adv. We consider the following
possible actions of an Adv against distributed IoT services:
Software adversary: Adv can compromise the binaries
of the services, can inject malicious code in the free space
of the program memory of a device, or can exploit a service
vulnerability to manipulate the data memory of a device at
runtime. Additionally, Adv can forge the attestation result
by managing to produce a valid result despite the software
modifications present on the device.
Man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack: Adv can eavesdrop
on and alter the communication data between services. Adv
will be particularly interested to alter the communication
data in such way that it will change the intended control-
flow of the invoked service.
Replay attack: Adv precomputes the operations of the
attestation procedure, and reports to V rf a previous valid
response which hides the attack.
Assumptions: Like in other attestation schemes, we
rule out physical attack, and we assume that a software
adversary cannot compromise hardware-protected memory.
While we do not consider Denial of Service (DoS) attacks,
we limit these attacks by using symmetric key for the service
invocations, thus, a device does not perform intensive com-
putations to refuse a fake service request. We also assume
that software attacks and Man in the middle (MITM) attacks
impact the control-flow of a service software. Furthermore,
we assume that services will respond during the attestation
procedure. However, since RADIS includes the attestation
result in the service invocations, typically a non responding
service will generate a timeout message. Consequently, the
final attestation result will not comprise the information
about the non responsive service.
B. Security requirements
In order to be resilient to the above attacks, the remote
attestation scheme of distributed services should satisfy the
following security properties:
• Authenticity and integrity of services: The attestation
scheme should perform software integrity verification
of a distributed service to guarantee that the distributed
service has not been modified by any software adver-
sary. In particular, the protocol should provide authentic
and reliable evidence to prove that at runtime a dis-
tributed service has followed a legitimate control-flow.
The attestation scheme should guarantee the integrity
and authenticity for each of the services that compose
a distributed service.
Verifier
 1 Build a Service Flow Graphfor each service flow  2
Build the Control Flow Graph
for each service  3
Generate the measurement
for each service flow  4
Store measurements 
in a database
Service measurement (One-time-only offline procedure)
  Siu   Sjv
 
Ch = {Siu, inputSiu}
 
callatt 
respatt 
 
   Result
Service attestation procedure
Device i Device j
 1
 3
 5
 7
 8 Verify Result with known measurements
Database with valid
measurements 
servatt  2 servatt 4
getrespatt  6
Figure 5. System model of remote attestation of a distributed IoT service, which consists of two services Siu and Sjv.
• Integrity of communication data: The attestation
scheme should detect the compromised state of dis-
tributed services when a MITM attack, which alters the
communication data between two distributed services,
causes the invoked service to execute a non-intended
control-flow.
Each distributed service should be able to verify the
trustworthy origin of the its inputs, and it should reject
any service calls invoked by an unauthorized device.
• Freshness: To be resilient to replay attack, any service
should not be able to reply to the attestation request
of V rf with a precomputed value that could hide an
ongoing attack on the service. Likewise, an invoked
service should prove to the calling service the freshness
of the response it provides to the caller.
VI. PRELIMINARIES
In order to achieve all security properties described above,
our attestation scheme requires the following components.
• Signature scheme: A signature scheme is a pair of
algorithms: a signature algorithm sig() and a veri-
fication algorithm vrfsig(). The signature algorithm
σ ← sig(sk;m) takes as input a message m and
a secret signing key sk and outputs a signature σ.
The verification algorithm {0, 1} ← vrfsig(pk;m,σ)
verifies whether σ is valid or invalid on input of a
message m, a signature σ, and a public verification
key pk.
• Message authentication code: A Message Authen-
tication code (MAC) is a pair of polynomial time
algorithms signMac() and verifyMac() such that
µ← signMac(k;m) outputs a MAC tag µ on input of
m and k, and {0, 1} ← verifyMac(k;m,µ) verifies
µ on input of m and k.
• Graph hashing: A Control Flow Graph represents the
legitimate execution flows of a given software. For
instance, Figure 6 depicts two valid execution flows:
N1 → N2 → N4 and N1 → N3 → N4, where each
graph node N1 .. N4 denotes a software instruction. We
borrow the hash engine from C-FLAT, which associates
each valid execution flow of a single device with a
unique hash value, computing Hl = Hash(Hl−1, Nl).
For example, Figure 6 shows H2 = Hash(H1, N2), and
the final hash value H4 represents the hash value for
each of the two legitimate execution flows.
N1
N2 N3
N4
H1 = H (0, N1)
H2 = H (H1, N2) H3 = H (H1, N3)
 H4 = H (H2, N4) OR  H (H3, N4)
Figure 6. Hashing Control Flow Graph in C-FLAT
• Device requirements: Each device deployed in a dis-
tributed service is equipped with a trusted anchor TAi.
A trust anchor is a lightweight hardware component
which provides an isolated measurement engine. This
trusted component cannot be disabled or modified by
non-physical means.
Table I
NOTATION SUMMARY
Term Description
OP System Operator
V rf Verifier of a distributed IoT system
SKV rf Secret key of V rf
PKV rf Public key of V rf
Di Device i
Prvi Prover i
TAi Trusted anchor of Di
ski Secret key of Di
pki Public key of Di
kij Symmetric key shared between Di and Dj
Siu Unique name of a service running on Di
SFG Service Flow Graph
LHVi Local Hash Value of the software execution
flow for the current service running on Di
GHVi Global Hash Value stored in Di for
the control-flow execution of a service flow
Procedure Description
signMac(k;m) generates MAC tag on m
verifyMac(k;m,µ) verifies MAC tag µ on m using k
sig(sk;m) encrypts message m using a secret key sk
vrfsig(pk;m,σ) verifies σ on m using public key pk
servatt() performs attestation for a given service
callatt() sends attestation request between two services
respatt() reports attestation result from invoked service
to calling service
getrespatt() retrieves the attestation response from invoked
service to calling service
VII. RADIS: OUR PROPOSAL FOR REMOTE
ATTESTATION OF DISTRIBUTED IOT SERVICES
We now describe RADIS, our remote attestation protocol
for distributed IoT services.
RADIS has two main operation modes: setup mode and
attestation mode. Setup mode is an initial procedure, exe-
cuted only once, which allows trustworthy execution of the
remote attestation protocol. Attestation mode is a periodical
procedure initiated by V rf at an arbitrary time. In Table 1,
we summarize the terms used in RADIS.
1) Setup mode: Setup mode includes two operations: key
setup and service measurement, executed respectively by
OP and V rf .
Key setup: To establish a secure communication be-
tween V rf and Prv, each deployed device Di knows
V rf ’s public key PKV rf and owns an asymmetric key-
pair (pki, ski). In addition, two devices Di and Dj that will
interact during the normal operations in the network estab-
lish a shared symmetric attestation Message Authentication
Code (MAC) key kij . The secret signing key ski and the
shared attestation key kij are both protected within the trust
anchor TAi, preventing untrusted parties from using these
keys. Alternatively, as a lightweight key exchanging scheme
between devices can be used a random key predistribution
scheme [20], [21], [22] which rely on probabilistic key
sharing among devices. The basic idea is that each device
is initialized with m keys, selected from a large pool of S
A
B
D
C
Siu
E
F
G
Sjv
H
Control-flow path
Service Flow path
Service init
Node of Control Flow Graph
H1 = Hash (0, Siu)
H2 = Hash (H1, A)
H3 = Hash (H2, B)
H9 = Hash (H8, C)
H4 = Hash (H3, Sjv)
H5 = Hash (H4, E)
H6 = Hash (H5, F)
H8 = Hash (H7, H)
H7 = Hash (H5, G)
H10 = Hash (H9, D)
Figure 7. Hashing procedure for a legitimate Service Flow
keys, such that two random subsets of size m in S will share
at least one key with some probability p. Next, devices will
perform shared-key-discovery to find out with which of other
device they share a key. Afterwards, a challenge-response
can be used to two devices that share a common key. Note
that the key setup process between devices is managed by
OP , and this paper assumes that two device Di and Dj
share a symmetric key kij without providing details about
the key management scheme.
Service measurement: Service measurement is one-
time-only procedure that V rf performs offline to measure
the legitimate service flows of a distributed service. Service
measurement procedure follows the assumption that V rf
has access to the binaries of all the services and V rf
knows in advance the legitimate interactions between IoT
devices. First, V rf builds a graph, in which the nodes
represent services and the edges determine the execution
order of the services in a distributed service. Next, V rf
builds the Control Flow Graph of every service and builds a
Service Flow Graph (SFG) to represent all the possible valid
transitions that a distributed service may follow at runtime.
Then, starting from each valid transition, V rf executes a
measurement function to associate each legitimate service
flow with a single hash value as shown in Figure 7. Finally,
V rf stores all the generated hash values in a database.
Although the measurement of the Control Flow Graph
can introduce high complexity, typically an IoT service is
expected to be less complex than traditional applications,
and V rf has sufficient processing resources. Moreover,
since V rf performs offline the software measuremens, the
complexity of software measurement does not impact the
performance of the remote attestation procedure.
2) Attestation mode: To check the integrity of all the
services that compose a distributed service, RADIS uses
two components: Local Hash Value (LHV ) to record the
local execution flow of a given service and Global Hash
Value (GHV ) to record the entire transition of a service
flow. LHV and GHV are both protected in TA.
                             Verifier
  R ←{0,1}n;
  σVrf←sig(SKVrf; Siu  ⃦inputSiu   ⃦R);
  
 vrfsig(pki; outputSiu, R, σPrv)
                                          Device i
if (vrfsig(PKVrf; Siu    ⃦ inputSiu  ⃦ R, σVrf)) then
Begin
        GHVi  ⟵ 0;
 servatt(Siu, inputSiu, GHVi)
                Begin
LHVi  ⟵  GHVi;
∀ Nl ∈ CFG(Siu)
begin
      LHVi  ⟵ Hash(LHVi, Nl);
end
      GHVi ⟵ LHVi
     return GHVi;
   End
 callatt()
     Begin 
Sjv ⟵  name of invoked service;
Ri ←{0,1}
n;
msgi ⟵ Sjv  ⃦outputSiu   ⃦GHVi   ⃦Ri;
µi⟵ signMac(kij; msgi);
                   End
     
       
    
getrespatt()
       Begin
if ( verifyMac(kij;msgj)) then
outputSjv   ⃦ GHVj   ⃦ Ri ⟵ resp;
GHVi   ⟵ GHVj;
        End
 possibly more to code attest by calling again 
 the procedures in 
       σPrv   ⟵ sig(ski; R   ⃦outputSiu  ⃦ GHVi)
        
   Else 
        Reject Ch;
  End.
              Device j
    
        
         
      
         
         
                     If (verifyMac(kij; msgi, µi)) then
          Begin
                         Sjv   ⃦ inputSjv   ⃦ GHVi   ⃦ Ri ⟵ msgi;
                         GHVj  ⟵ servatt(Sjv, inputSjv, GHVi);
              respatt()
    Begin
                                msgj ⟵ Ri   ⃦ outputSjv   ⃦ GHVj;
                                µj ⟵ signMac(kij; msgj);
    End
                  
           Else 
               Reject req;
            End.
  Ch = {Siu, inputSiu, R, σVrf}
        req = {msgi,  µi}
  Result = { R, outputSiu, GHVi, σPrv}
      resp = {msgj,  µj}
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
2 3 6
Figure 8. The attestation protocol
The attestation procedure starts with V rf who sends an
attestation request Ch = Siu, inputSiu, R, σV rf , where Siu
is the name of the service to be attested, inputSiu is the
initial input for the given service Siu, R is a randomized
nonce to ensure the freshness of the communication, and
σV rf is V rf ’s signature over Siu, inputSiu and R (as
shown in Step 1© in Figure 8). Upon receiving the attestation
request Ch, the device Di, which serves as a prover Prvi,
verifies the signature by using the V rf ’s public key PKV rf .
If the signature is valid, RADIS protocol, which is running
on Prvi, invokes the procedure servatt (Step 2©) to attest
Siu with the provided input inputSiu. Since Siu is the
first service of the service flow, GHVi will be initialized
with 0. The invocation of servatt triggers TAi to trace
the execution flow of Siu, to compute a hash value for
each instruction, and to store the accumulated hash value
in LHVi. The single hash value accumulated in LHVi
represents the complete runtime state of Siu. After all the
instructions are measured, servatt updates the value of
GHVi with the computed hash LHVi.
When Siu invokes another service Sjv, the code of Siu
that handles the service invocation will be attested by the
method callatt (Step 3©). Among the arguments of the
service call, the service invocation will also include the
attestation result of Siu and a nonce R to initiate the at-
testation for Sjv. Specifically, to initiate the request, callatt
computes a MAC signature µi = signMac(kij ;msgi) over
the message msgi = Sjv, outputSiu, GHVi, Ri, where Sjv
is the name of the invoked service, outputSiu is the output
Siu which serves as input data in the service call, GHVi is
the attestation result of Siu registered in TAi, and Ri is a
randomized nonce. On receiving the service request, Dj uses
kij to verify the MAC signature verifyMac(kij ;msgi, µi)
and prove the authenticity and integrity of the request.
In case the service call is valid, RADIS protocol running
on Dj starts the attestations for Sjv by calling servatt
(Step 4©) on the received input data. The code of Sjv which
handles the response will be attested by respatt (Step 5©).
In details, respatt returns a MAC signature µj over msgj =
Ri, outputSjv , GHVj , where Ri is the randomized nonce,
outputSjv is the output data produced by the execution of
Sjv, and GHVj is the hash value of the attestation protocol.
Next, Di handles the response of Dj by calling getrespatt
(Step 6©) and updates GHVi with the hash value GHVj
produced by Dj . After processing the response, in the case
Siu continues the execution of some more lines of code,
RADIS will trigger servatt to attest the code or will call
again callatt and getrespatt if Siu invokes other service
calls.
Upon the completion of service execution for each of the
service that compose a service flow, Prvi retrieves GHVi
stored locally, and it sends back to V rf the signed attestation
result σPrv =sig(ski;R ‖ outputSiu ‖ GHVi) (Step 7©).
V rf verifies the signature of the response vrfsig(pki;R ‖
outputSiu ‖ GHVi ‖ σPrv)) and then proceeds with hash
validation. Since V rf has initially stored the valid hash for
each service, to validate the attestation response, V rf checks
in the database whether GHVi is among the legitimate hash
values saved in the database. If it matches with the hash
value of GHVi reported by Prvi, then GHVi serves as as
an evidence that proves that each service that composes the
service flow is legitimate.
VIII. QUALITATIVE EVALUATION
Regardless of the number of services that compose a
service flow, the attestation result that will be invoked in
the service call is always a single hash value. Therefore, the
overhead of invoking the attestation result in a service call
is constant in the number of services that compose a given
service flow. In addition, the complexity of attestation for
each service that composes a given service flow is linear to
the number of control-flow instructions that the service has
to execute.
In practice, RADIS requires code instrumentation to allow
the instructions to be intercepted by a trampoline and then
processed by a trusted hash engine, following the design
of [10]. In addition, RADIS requires an enhancement of
the instrumentation mechanism in order to intercept the
service call and initialize the measurement engine with the
attestation result of the calling service. Therefore, RADIS
introduces an additional overhead due to context switch on
intercepting the instructions and the service calls. However,
the overhead of intercepting the software instructions with
code instrumentation can be reduced by using a trusted
hardware component to intercept the control-flow as shown
in [17]. In the verification process of a given service flow,
V rf ensures the trustworthy state of all the services that
compose that service flow by comparing one single hash
value with the known measurements previously stored in
database.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
While IoT systems become interoperable, an important
challenge for the remote attestation schemes is to guarantee
the trustworthy state of the IoT services that compose a
distributed service. Secure interaction between devices is a
key issue in IoT systems, and in this paper, we emphasize
the need of a distributed services attestation in IoT systems.
We presented a protocol that provides a comprehensive and
reliable integrity check of a distributed service. Our solution
gives evidence about the trustworthiness of the services
that compose a distributed services and the interaction flow
between services.
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